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1 Introduction 
This document describes the realization of Canonical Use Case 3, Remote File Access, using the 
XSEDE X-WAVE architectural components. See http://hdl.handle.net/2142/43877 for the use 
cases. 
It is assumed that the reader has already read and is very familiar with the XSEDE Architecture  
Level 3 Decomposition (L3D), in particular sections 3 (Access Layer), 4.1 (Open Standards-
Based Web Services Architecture), 5 (X-WAVE), and 8 (Deployment).  Further, the Genesis II 
Omnibus Reference Manual (GORM) will be frequently referred to.  The authors suggest that 
these two documents be open or on hand when reading this document. 
 
1.1 Structure of this Document 
This document is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the remote file access use case. 
Section 3 describes how the X-WAVE components are used to implement the use case from sec-
tion 2.  
1.2 Document Management and Configuration Control  
This Version 0.91 
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2 Canonical Use Case 3 
Canonical use case 1 is "Remote file access".  The description is "The user creates, reads, up-
dates, and deletes files and directories from one site at another using POSIX operations, e.g., cre-
ate, read, write, unlink. Note that “site” can refer to an XSEDE SP, a local campus, a research lab, 
a desktop computer, or even a home computer". 
The use case starts with a number of assumptions, specifically: 
Prerequisites	  (Dependencies)	  &	  
Assumptions 
a)	  The	  client	  is	  properly	  authenticated,	  and	  has	  required	  permissions. 
b)	  The	  client	  is	  familiar	  with	  Unix	  file	  commands,	  and	  applications	  use	  the	  standard	  POSIX	  file	  system	  
commands. 
c)	  The	  file(s)	  and	  directory(s)	  being	  accessed	  exist. 
d)	  There	  is	  sufficient	  space	  for	  those	  file(s)	  and	  directory(s)	  on	  the	  destination	  file	  system. 
e)	  The	  file	  and	  directory	  services,	  source	  file	  system,	  destination	  file	  system,	  and	  intervening	  network	  do	  
not	  fail	  during	  execution	  of	  the	  file	  transfer. 
 
There are then a number of variants and quality attributes for the use case. These are shown be-
low. 
Variations	  (optional) a)	  The	  user	  accesses	  the	  remote	  file	  system	  or	  storage	  using	  command	  line	  tools. 
b)	  The	  user	  accesses	  the	  remote	  file	  system	  or	  storage	  using	  a	  GUI. 
c)	  The	  user	  accesses	  the	  remote	  file	  system	  or	  storage	  using	  an	  API	  other	  than	  POSIX. 
d)	  The	  authorized	  user	  changes	  the	  access	  control	  list	  on	  a	  file	  or	  directory. 
Quality	  Attributes a)	  Availability	  of	  the	  file	  and	  directory	  services	  is	  at	  three	  Sigma. 
b)	  Unauthorized	  access	  of	  a	  file	  or	  directory	  will	  result	  in	  an	  error	  message	  that	  is	  consistent,	  meaningful,	  and	  helpful. 
c)	  Changes	  to	  the	  remote	  file	  system	  are	  visible	  to	  users	  within	  30	  seconds. 
d)	  Consistency	  and	  update	  semantics	  must	  be	  clearly	  defined	  for	  the	  implementation. 
e)	  Disconnected	  operation	  is	  not	  a	  requirement. 
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3 Remote File Accss 
The use case did not mention requirements with respect to client operating system. There are 
many client operating systems, Linux, Windows, Andriod, and MacOS are among the most popu-
lar. The basic architectural technique to meet this use case is similar regardless of the operating 
system: Develop an OS-specific file system “driver” that presents the required file system inter-
face to the operating system and interacts with RNS and ByteIO services as described in the L3D.  
In the description below we will refer to an instance of this approach for Linux using FUSE. 
Similar techniques can be used for other operating systems. For example in Sosa, C. and A.S. 
Grimshaw, Bringing the Grid home, in Proceedings of the 2008 9th IEEE/ACM International 
Conference on Grid Computing. 2008, IEEE Computer Society, the authors describe an imple-
mentation for Windows using Windows Installable File Systems (IFS). 
The particular operating systems to be supported is up to the UREP. 
 
Assume that  
1. The	  Genesis	  II	  Access	  Layer	  component	  is	  installed	  on	  the	  users	  machine	  (L3D	  5.4.4).	  	  
2. The	  user	  is	  on	  a	  Linux	  machine,	  and	  the	  user	  is	  in	  the	  fuser	  group,	  i.e.,	  they	  have	  permis-­‐
sion	  to	  use	  FUSE	  to	  mount	  file	  systems.	  
3. The	  Genesis	  II	  container	  (L3D	  5.4.3)	  is	  correctly	  installed	  on	  any	  resource	  to	  be	  used	  to	  
either	  export	  data	  or	  store	  data	  (L3D	  5.2.2,	  L3D	  5.3.3-­‐5.3.8)	  and	  has	  been	  instantiated	  
and	  properly	  configured	  (e.g.	  GORM	  E.3.2,	  F.3).	  
4. The user is authorized to access the directories and files necessary for the use case, This 
might include for example their myproxy certificate as their session certificate (L3D	  5.3.2.2,	  XSEDE	  Portal	  ID	  Case) AND SAML assertion chains such as gffs-user.	  
5. The	  remote	  files	  have	  been	  exported	  (L3D	  5.3.6,	  GORM	  E.3.2).	  6. The	  client	  computer	  that	  the	  user	  is	  using	  is	  connected	  to	  the	  internet	  and	  can	  make	  
TCP	  connections	  to	  the	  internet.	  Similarly	  it	  is	  assumed	  that	  the	  Genesis	  II	  containers	  are	  
functioning	  and	  reachable	  from	  the	  internet.	  Steps:	  
Use the grid command client to "mount" the file system. (GORM E.3.3) 
 grid fuse --mount local:{/local/path} & 
where local:/local/path is the directory where the user wants to mount the GFFS. 
Access to remote files and directories is now accomplished on the client site using POSIX file 
system calls from a user program or a shell such as bash. These are mapped using the Linux VFS 
to the Genesis II client FUSE implementation started in step 1 above. These in turn are imple-
mented as follows: 
• Directory	  path	  lookups	  are	  performed	  as	  shown	  in	  L3D	  5.3.1.	  
• File	  read/write	  is	  performed	  as	  shown	  in	  L3D	  5.3.3.	  
• File	  create	  is	  performed	  as	  shown	  in	  L3D	  5.3.4.	  
• File	  delete	  is	  performed	  as	  shown	  in	  L3D	  5.3.5.	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3.1 Variants 
 
3.1.1 Variant UCCAN 3.a - The user accesses the remote file system or storage 
using command line tools. 
As described in L3D 3.2.3 and GORM E.4 there are command line tools that follow the Unix file 
system commands: ls, cp, rm, cat, mkdir, unlink, cd, and pwd. 
Assume that  
1. The	  Genesis	  II	  Access	  Layer	  component	  is	  installed	  on	  the	  users	  machine	  (L3D	  5.4.4)	  –	  
the	  client.	  	  
2. The	  Genesis	  II	  container	  (L3D	  5.4.3)	  is	  correctly	  installed	  on	  any	  resource	  to	  be	  used	  to	  
either	  export	  data	  or	  store	  data	  (L3D	  5.2.2,	  L3D	  5.3.3-­‐5.3.8)	  and	  has	  been	  instantiated	  
and	  properly	  configured	  (e.g.	  GORM	  E.3.2,	  F.3).	  
3. Users	  have	  necessary	  permissions.	  
4. The	  remote	  files	  have	  been	  exported	  (L3D	  5.3.6,	  GORM	  E.3.2).	  5. The	  user	  is	  authenticated	  as	  described	  in	  L3D	  5.3.2.2	  (XSEDE	  Portal	  ID	  Case).	  This	  means	  that	  the	  client	  session	  has	  an	  XSEDE	  MyProxy	  session	  certificate	  as	  well	  as	  delegated	  SAML	  certificates	  from	  an	  KerbAuthNPortType.	  If	  the	  client	  is	  on	  a	  Linux	  machine	  we	  recommend	  that	  they	  mount	  the	  GFFS	  using	  a	  FUSE	  driver	  and	  use	  the	  Unix	  shell	  commands	  directly.	  	  Otherwise	  use	  the	  grid	  shell	  commands	  as	  described	  below.	  Steps:	  
1) On	  the	  client	  the	  user	  executes	  the	  Genesis	  II	  grid	  command.	  This	  starts	  up	  the	  Genesis	  
II	  client	  package	  (L3D	  5.4.4).	  The	  client	  program	  begins	  in	  the	  shell.	  The	  user	  can	  stay	  in	  
the	  basic	  shell,	  or	  select	  the	  GUI-­‐based	  shell	  tool.	  The	  GUI	  based	  shell	  tool	  has	  history	  as	  
well	  as	  command	  line	  and	  file	  completion	  (i.e.,	  tab	  completion)	  support.	  
2) The	  client	  then	  interacts	  with	  the	  back-­‐end	  RNS	  and	  ByteIO	  endpoints	  as	  described	  in:	  	  
o Directory	  path	  lookups	  are	  performed	  as	  shown	  in	  L3D	  5.3.1.	  
o File	  read/write	  is	  performed	  as	  shown	  in	  L3D	  5.3.3.	  
o File	  create	  is	  performed	  as	  shown	  in	  L3D	  5.3.4.	  
o File	  delete	  is	  performed	  as	  shown	  in	  L3D	  5.3.5.	  
3.1.2 Variant UCCAN 3.b - The user accesses the remote file system or storage 
using a GUI 
The architecture provided (see base case) supports any GUI that uses POSIX file system inter-
faces to read and write files and directories for Linux systems. Other operating systems, e.g., 
Windows or Mac can be supported in a similar manner but require the drivers to be written.   
Currently for Linux, Mac and Windows there is also a GUI embedded in the Genesis II client 
GFFS (L3D 3.3.2). 
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3.1.3 Variant UCCAN 3.c - The user accesses the remote file system or storage 
using an API other than POSIX 
The XSEDE architecture clearly envisions many different access layer tools including APIs being 
developed. These APIs and associated libraries can be used to interact with services layer compo-
nents, including remote files.  
Assuming that one or more language bindings of the such APIs  are implemented, the client li-
brary implementation would interact with back-end RNS and ByteIO endpoints as described in . 
o Directory	  path	  lookups	  are	  performed	  as	  shown	  in	  L3D	  5.3.1.	  
o File	  read/write	  is	  performed	  as	  shown	  in	  L3D	  5.3.3.	  
o File	  create	  is	  performed	  as	  shown	  in	  L3D	  5.3.4.	  
o File	  delete	  is	  performed	  as	  shown	  in	  L3D	  5.3.5.	  
3.1.4 Variant UCCAN 3.d - The authorized user changes the access control list 
on a file or directory 
Recall that Genesis II containers by default use access control lists for all grid resources stored in 
the container (L3D 5.4.3.2). “Write” rights on a grid resource grant the holder of those rights the 
ability to update the access control list for that grid resource (GORM E.2.3). 
There are two mechanisms available to update grid resource access control lists: via the Genesis 
II command line interface (L3D 3.2.3) and via the Genesis II GUI (L3D 3.3.2). In both cases the 
steps are the same. 
Assume that  
1. The	  Genesis	  II	  Access	  Layer	  component	  is	  installed	  on	  the	  users	  machine	  (L3D	  5.4.4)	  –	  
the	  client.	  	  
2. If	  the	  GUI	  is	  to	  be	  used,	  the	  client	  has	  desktop	  support,	  and	  that	  the	  Java	  Swing	  libraries	  
operate	  on	  that	  desktop.	  
3. The	  Genesis	  II	  container	  (L3D	  5.4.3)	  is	  correctly	  installed	  on	  any	  resource	  to	  be	  used	  to	  
either	  export	  data	  or	  store	  data	  (L3D	  5.2.2,	  L3D	  5.3.3-­‐5.3.8)	  and	  has	  been	  instantiated	  
and	  properly	  configured	  (e.g.	  GORM	  E.3.2,	  F.3).	  
4. Users	  have	  necessary	  permissions.	  
5. The	  remote	  files	  have	  been	  exported	  (L3D	  5.3.6,	  GORM	  E.3.2).	  6. The	  user	  is	  authenticated	  as	  described	  in	  L3D	  5.3.2.2	  (XSEDE	  Portal	  ID	  Case).	  This	  means	  that	  the	  client	  session	  has	  an	  XSEDE	  MyProxy	  session	  certificate	  as	  well	  as	  delegated	  SAML	  certificates	  from	  an	  KerbAuthNPortType.	  Steps:	  
1) On	  the	  client	  the	  user	  executes	  the	  Genesis	  II	  grid	  command.	  This	  starts	  up	  the	  Genesis	  
II	  client	  package	  (L3D	  5.4.4).	  The	  client	  program	  begins	  in	  the	  shell.	  If	  the	  GUI	  is	  to	  be	  
used	  the	  user	  then	  enters	  client-­‐ui	  <cr>	  in	  the	  shell.	  	  This	  starts	  up	  the	  GUI	  (L3D	  3.3.2).	  
2) The	  user	  selects	  the	  grid	  resource	  for	  which	  to	  change	  the	  ACL.	  This	  will	  happen	  either	  
via	  the	  GUI	  file	  picker,	  or	  using	  ls	  and	  cd	  command	  in	  the	  shell.	  
a. Directory	  path	  lookups	  are	  performed	  as	  shown	  in	  L3D	  5.3.1.	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3) At	  this	  point	  the	  user	  either	  executes	  the	  grid	  shell	  chmod	  command	  (	  L3D	  3.2.3.2)	  or	  
the	  GUI	  access	  control	  list	  tool	  (L3D	  3.3.2.4).	  
4) The	  client	  calls	  the	  WS-­‐ResourceProperty	  GetResourceProperty()	  method	  (L3D	  4.1.7)	  of	  
the	  resource	  requesting	  the	  access	  control	  list.	  
5) The	  client	  either	  adds	  another	  access	  control	  list	  element,	  or	  deletes	  an	  access	  control	  
list	  element	  to	  the	  access	  control	  list.	  
6) The	  client	  calls	  the	  WS-­‐ResourceProperty	  SetResourceProperties()	  method	  of	  the	  re-­‐
source	  passing	  in	  the	  new	  access	  control	  list.	  
 
 
3.2 Quality of Service Attributes 
 
3.2.1 QAS UCCAN 3.a - Availability of the file and directory services is at three 
Sigma. 
See L3D 5.5.3 for background on availability before proceeding. The basic techniques to improve 
the availability of a given container as described in L3D 5.5.3, such as use of relational databases, 
high-availability hardware, replicated hardware, etc. can be used.  
Viewing and modifying an ACL with the ACL tool. To add a user or group drag the user or 
group icon from the user/groupd directory into a read, write, or execute box. To remove an 
entry, drag the entry to the trash can. 
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To protect against the case that a container fails or becomes inaccessible despite the above tech-
niques, X-WAVE provides a means to replicate files and directories1. L3D sections 5.2.2.3 Ran-
domByteIO, 5.2.4.1 Resolver, 5.2.4.2 EnhancedRNSPortType, 5.3.7 write to a replicated file, 
5.3.8 write to a replicated directory, and 5.3.12 availability, describe the basic mechanisms. 
Suppose that the client determines that a replicated file or directory service is no longer available 
or reachable. This is usually detected in the access layer client tooling as a communication fault. 
Once it has been established at the transport layer that an endpoint is unreachable, the client re-
binds the EPR as described in L3D 5.3.7 and 5.3.8.  The basic protocol is 
1. Determine that there has been a communication fault. 
2. Examine the EPR of the file or directory and determine if it is WS-Naming com-
pliant and has a resolver EPR. 
3. If so, repeat while there are more EPRs to try  
a. contact the resolver and acquire a new EPR for the file or directory 
b. Attempt to use the new EPR to communicate with the file or directory 
c. if successful, return  
4. Throw a fault 
Note that re-binding is only an option if the file or directory has been replicated. 
Using replicated file and directories all copies of the file or directory must have either failed or be 
inaccessible to the client. Assuming that the probability of failure of any given replica is the 
same, and the underlying networks are assumed to always work, then 
Availability = 1 - (1-availability of each replica)number of replicants 
Suppose the availability of each replica is .99 An availability rate of .99 is a very easy to reach 
number for a single container. In our experience we see non-scheduled down times for managed 
containers at a rate of minutes per month, with the real issue being the mean time to repair. When 
a fault occurs at night we do not see it until the next day, adding hours of downtime. This could 
be mitigated with automated phone calls to staff.   
Given the above, a 2-replicated file or directory would have an availability of  
Availability = 1 - (1-.99)2 = 1 - .0001= .9999 
This significantly exceeds the requirement. 
Note that the above also assumes that the resolver is operational. The math is a bit more compli-
cated, but assuming that the failure of the replica’s and the resolver are independent, then the 
availability is the same. In other words, for the file not to be available either primary and resolver 
or the primary and secondary must both have failed. 
The procedure to create replica’s is given in GORM G.2.5 Replication of GFFS Assets.  
Note to SD&I. This should be logged to a log file so that we can measure how effective this tech-
nique is.  
                                                      
1 Valente, S. and Grimshaw, A. Replicated Grid Resources Grid 2011: 12th IEEE/ACM Interna-
tional Conference on Grid Computing, IEEE/ACM, Lyon, France, 2011. 
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3.2.2 QAS UCCAN 3.a - Unauthorized access of a file or directory will result in 
an error message that is consistent, meaningful, and helpful. 
Unauthorized access to a file or directory is defined as an attempt to access a file or directory 
when the caller (client) has no credentials in their credential wallet, carried in the SOAP header as 
described in L3D 4.1.1 and WS-Interoperability Basic Security Profile (WSI-BSP), that match 
against any access control list element in the appropriate read, write, or execute access control list 
for the file or directory (L3D 5.4.3.2 Authorization). 
As described in L3D 5.4.3.2 when an unauthorized request is recognized a security fault is thrown 
as described in Oasis WS BaseFaults 1.2. The SecurityException class extends the BaseFaults by 
indicating the fault is a security fault. 
The set of security faults is defined to be one of several extensible security faults. All implemen-
tations of ByteIO and RNS will use the same set of defined security faults. These need to be 
documented by SD&I. 
Faults, including security faults, are delivered to the user via different mechanisms depending on 
the access modality.  
When using the grid command line shell faults are caught by the shell and displayed in the shell 
window. The level of detail is determined by a user configuration property that sets the level of 
detail to HIGH, MEDIUM, or LOW. LOW gives only general information, e.g, Friday Sept 27 
11:26:48 CEST 2013:  No Authorization for target AG-Dir.  HIGH gives the complete stack 
trace. 
When using the GUI faults error and warning messages are displayed in messages box at the bot-
tom of the main GUI window. The messages window displays LOW level of detail messages 
from faults and warnings. When available, more detail may be viewed by double clicking on the 
error message. In the example below the user is trying to access a directory, AG-Dir, without 
authorization. Double clicking on the error message displays the stack trace in a new window. 
The stack trace is not generally useful for end users, but is very handy for identifying problems. 
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When using the FUSE file system driver faults are converted into their Unix equivalents. This is 
usually quite simple, the error codes from the IO operation are propagated up the call stack, back 
to the client as an errno, and then returned. So for example, a quota error will return 
#define EDQUOT      122 /* Quota exceeded */ 
 
3.2.3 Changes to the remote file system are visible to users within 30 seconds. 
There are three cases of interest: reading and writing non-replicated resources without a cache, 
reading and writing non-replicated resources with a cache, and reading and writing replicated 
resources. 
3.2.3.1 Reading and writing non-replicated resources with no cache 
For non replicated files when using direct access (i.e., by-passing cache’s) the semantics are Unix 
semantics. The reader is guaranteed to read the last value written, and last writer wins. This fol-
lows from not using caches. Any read is direct to the single copy of the file. Similarly with writes. 
Reads and writes are serialized in first come first served order at the source of the file, i.e., the 
ByteIO resource representing the file. The same is true for reads and writes (list, unlink, and add) 
on RNS endpoints. 
The GUI with an authorization fault displayed in the messages box. 
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3.2.3.2 Reading and writing non-replicated resources with a cache 
The Genesis II client implements two different types of cache -  a timeout based cache and a call-
back cache invalidation based cache. 
The time-out based cache uses an LRU replacement strategy with a default 30 second timeout.. 
When an item has been in the cache for the timeout interval it is thrown out. The only items 
cached are directories and metadata (i.e. stat info). This is particularly important when using the 
Genesis II FUSE implementation as Unix can be quite chatty with directories. 
Before we begin it is important to point out that Genesis II directory entries have all of the meta-
data needed for each entry. When a list operation is performed on a Genesis II RNS directory the 
directory service (L3D XXX), in so much as is possible, pre-fetches metadata information such as 
the create time, last update time, size, and RWX permissions of the caller.   
The call-back based cache follows traditional cache call-back invalidation protocols. On reading a 
directory or performing a stat on a resource the cache loads the meta-data into the cache. If the 
RNS endpoint supports the WS-Notification interface (which the client can determine for Genesis 
II endpoints by examining the EPR of the directory) then the client subscribes to updates on the 
directory using WS-Notification. If the RNS does not support notification, the item is cached for 
the default period. 
3.2.3.3 Reading and Writing Replicated Resources 
As of this writing some resources can be replicated, e.g., files, directories, and WS-Trust STSs.  
Replicated directory resources can be cached as described above. STS and ByteIO file resources 
are not at this time cached, whether replicated or not. 
When replicated, files, directories, and STS resources follow the eventual consistency protocol 
described in [Valente 2011].  When not disconnected or down the time taken to update all rep-
lica’s is: 
Number of replicas* time to send a notification of the change to each replica 
Note that notifications are sent asynchronously by each container after a response has been sent to 
the client indicating that the update is successful. In a local area environment the time to send a 
notification (including all of the security) is on the order of 50mS. In a wide area environment, 
e.g., US/Europe or west coast to east coast, the time can be as high as 800mS.  The number of 
replicas is under user control, but typically is less than 3, and we do not expect replication levels 
over 10 except for a small number of highly accessed, read mostly resources such as the root of 
the name space and the first level down. 
Let us assume three replica’s for the sake of discussion. The time to propagate updates is in the 
“worst” case 
3*800mS = 2.4 seconds.  
Well below 30 seconds. 
In the event that one of the containers holding a replica is down, or not connected to the network, 
updated information will not propagate to the replica until it is reconnected. At that point a large 
number of updates may be needed, and it is impossible to predict a priori how long that will take. 
3.2.3.4 Future plans – automatic replication of files and directories for improved 
performance 
The architects propose a mechanism to improve performance for both directories and files: auto-
matic replication to local containers with large amounts of disk. The disk not be high speed or 
reliable. The basic idea is simple. 
• A client may have a defined environment variable – GFFS-Replica Store, that is a GFFS 
path to a “local” replica store.  
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• If the client has a GRS defined, then when a file or directory is opened for reading and 
the client has permission (including a resource parameter “replicable”) , the client initi-
ates a background replica instantiation on the GRS. Once confirmation that the local rep-
lica has been created (not necessarily completed replication) the client switches to using 
the replica for reads and writes. Subsequent “local” access will be handed off to the local 
GRS for reads and writes. 
• Consistency is maintained as for other replicated resources. 
• The GRS can throw out replicas as needed to make room for new replica’s. An LRU al-
gorithm is recommended. 
3.2.4 Consistency and update semantics must be clearly defined for the 
implementation 
For non replicated files when using direct access (i.e., by-passing cache’s) the semantics are Unix 
semantics. The reader is guaranteed to read the last value written, and last writer wins. 
For replicated files the semantics are eventual consistency. See [Valente 2011]. 
When caching is in use on the client side a decision was made not to support UNIX semantics. It 
is well known that UNIX semantics is difficult – and costly in terms of performance to enforce. 
Instead the default client behavior is to cache directories for 30 seconds, and to not cache data. 
The default behavior can be over-ridden in two ways. Cache time-outs for individual directories 
can be manually set in a configuration file (deprecated) and WS-Notification subscriptions can be 
posted to files and directories that are cached, and they are held in the cache until a notification is 
received or the timeout occurs and no information has been received from the notification broker 
during the timeout interval. 
